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Abstract: 
Contracting the private sector to construct and operate public infrastructure under the Private Finance initiative (PFI) has 
generated a lot of heated debate among practitioners. The debates derive their steam from increasing reports of failures which 
have bedeviled projects under these PFI arrangements. It has now become clear that there seems to be a general lack of 
adequate PFI contracting skills among public sector clients. The result is a lopsided risk transfer arrangement where the private 
sector privatizes profits and nationalizes losses. This study reports the results of a cross-sector survey attempting to investigate 
one of the most important issues raised in the now reformed PF2-public sector skills. It was found that stakeholder 
management, contract management, bid evaluation, risk management and regulatory governance skills were the most important 
overall. Though slight differences in ranking exist between the private and public sector but they tended not to be statistically 
significant. 
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1. Introduction 
Private involvement in the provision of public infrastructure and services has become a global ‘religion’ cutting 
across all regions irrespective of race, type of government or level of industrialization. Rich and poor countries 
alike have adopted the concept to either develop green fields or upgrade brownfield infrastructure in their domain. 
There are three categories of countries according to how they embraced the concept, the “pro” include European 
countries with the UK at the lead, the “reluctant” include Latin American and African countries who were forced 
by donor agencies to accept private participation as a pre-condition for loans [1] and the third group are the ‘copy 
cats’ who saw it as the “new fad” in infrastructure assets acquisition and decided to adopt it[2]. The concept of 
partnership was the direct result of the New Public Management (NPM), which is the adoption of market 
mechanism and practices into the public services; and the disenchantment with privatization. These reforms 
focused on the transformation of the government by (i) promoting decentralization and (ii) moving service 
management out of the public sector through privatization and other service mechanisms based in the private sector 
[3]. Contemporary literature attributes the present day partnerships to the UK government, hence most available 
evidence are drawn from there.  Public-private partnerships is simply a partnership between a government and a 
private company usually a consortium for the provision of public services under contract for a specific duration  
and a specified ‘minimum’ quality in return for availability or performance payment to the private company. The  
“Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is a PPP special case where all the finance needed for the capital funding and its 
basic operation is supplied by the private sector in return for a service charge” [4]. Over the years, there has been 
an increasing disenchantment with these PFI projects. There are accusations they are not delivering value for 
money, risk transfer biased in favor of the private sector and excess profiteering by private providers. But the 
private sector claim they are working within the provisions of the contract and have done nothing wrong. Hence, it 
appears the initial negotiations and contract design aspects were faulty resulting in lopsided risk transfers. This can 
only happen in the absence of the relevant expertise on the client side during negotiations and subsequent contract 
signing. Therefore, it has become pertinent to seek and find out what skills are actually required by the public 
sector client if the PFI is to work for all stakeholders-Government, the private sector, the public and civil societies. 
Hence, the major objective of this study is to identify based on a survey of practitioners, the most important PFI 
skills required by the public sector client. 
2. Proliferation of titles & rationale 
Many reasons have been adduced for the adoption of the PFI concept; however the reasons have continued to 
change over the years in the face of economic volatility. In the UK for instance, it was adopted to curb and control 
public sector borrowing and provide the needed infrastructure off-balance-sheet without increasing the public 
sector debt.  It is however ironical that the government should accept private finance in place of a cheaper public 
sector borrowing capacity [5]. It was also believed to offer better value for money (VFM) than the traditional 
procurement route  [6], manage the twin risks of time and costs overrun[4], provide infrastructure faster than 
would otherwise be possible relying entirely on public finances, reduce the presence of government in the 
economy, provide services inclusive of maintenance and the failure of the public sector to efficiently deliver public 
services. In another study by [7], they argue that the UK government has not been straight forward and consistent 
about the rationale upon which it adopted the PFI because it keeps changing the rationale. 
While, [8] contends that private involvement in infrastructure was also as a result of the intolerable damage 
caused by mismanagement of public enterprises arguing that these enterprises pursued multiple, poorly defined, 
conflicting objectives, with managers often appointed based on their political loyalty, and not competence. 
Investment funds were frequently squandered on poor projects. Moreover, price controls were imposed without 
regard for their performance implications, subjecting enterprises to financial distress and impairing their ability to 
mobilize investments and provide reliable services[9]. PFI promised improved efficiency and social benefits and a 
lower level of corruption in the reformed sectors. They argued further that most importantly; the main motivation 
for these reforms was often the need to cut fiscal deficits rather than a concern for performance. While [10] argues 
that PFI are also used to improve economic competitiveness. However in a recent survey [11] of PFI stakeholders 
conducted to identify the most important benefits which have been achieved by the PFI, among 20 benefits listed, 
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“Helps eliminates corruption” was ranked last by both the public and private sector participants surveyed. Other 
reasons for the use of PFI include external pressures from multi-lateral financial institutions like the World Bank, 
IMF and European Union [12]. 
Over the years since the start of the concept in 1992 in the UK, over 700 projects worth £55billion [13] have 
been contracted involving schools, NHS hospitals, prisons, tolled roads, museums etc. However, in spite of the 
glitz surrounding this procurement method, notable failures have occurred and continue to occur, creating doubts 
regarding the effectiveness of all the theoretical assumptions proposed. Some of the notable failures in terms of 
private involvement in infrastructure include Cochabamba [14], Indah water Konsortium[15], Buenos Aires water 
concession [16], Skye toll bridge, Metronet and London underground in the UK  and a host of deals gone badly 
wrong exist across both developing and developed countries alike. PFI has also been castigated for its lack of 
accountability, loss of democratic control and excessive confidentiality [17]; she also provides a list of about 100 
PFI projects across UK, Australia and Canada which have either failed or was cancelled having found that they 
lacked value for money. The general public in developing and transition economies’ disenchantment with private 
participation in infrastructure is higher in Latin America, which according to [18] has been a playground for the 
international financial institutions who are at the forefront of advocating for this involvement as a pre-condition for 
extending development loans. And this is also the reason why much of the available evidence on the impact of 
infrastructure reforms comes from Latin America [19]  because they were much braver in accepting and adopting 
the market mechanisms which were suggested by donor agencies. Scottish economists Jim and Margaret Cuthbert 
found that the equity investors in the Hairmyres hospital in East Kilbride, construction firm Kier and financiers 
Innisfree, stood to make £145m from an initial investment of £8.4m [20].  The UK’s HM treasury recently released 
its report on PFI reforms [13] and has identified among other things the lack of adequate PFI procurement skills 
among the public sector client. Therefore, it has become pertinent to seek and find out what skills are actually 
required by the public sector client if the PFI is to work for all stakeholders-Government, the private sector, the 
public and civil societies. Hence, the major objective of this study is to identify, based on a survey of practitioners, 
the most important PFI skills required by the public sector client. 
3. PFI procurement skills 
Contracting for public infrastructure with the private sector is not a new area for public sector clients, the public 
and private sector have had a long history of contracting with each other. What has changed under the PFI is the 
responsibility sharing. Hitherto under the traditional procurement method, the public sector in conjunction with 
external consultants provides design and specifications for proposed projects. However, that role (design & 
Specification) has been delegated to the private provider while the public sector is supposed to master the art of 
specifying output requirements. In addition to specifying output requirements, the public sector client is 
responsible for the evaluation of the submitted bids, engages the winning bidder in negotiations. Also a function of 
the public client is contract design and risk allocation between the two parties, assessing the financing options 
available and approving the best option are all functions of the public sector that had in the past been responsible 
for providing such finance. The sources and types of financing used by the project consortium have a great 
influence on the outcome of the project including the final user fees for stand-alone (Non-recourse) projects. The 
reason for this is that, most PFI/PPP projects are financed by a combination of 10-15% risk-bearing share capital 
and 85-90% bank borrowing[21]. This debt equity-ratio substantially increases the risk profile for the public sector 
hence the need to be appropriately skilled in financial engineering and modeling. PFI create administrative and 
implementation challenges for public procurement professionals that are not found in more traditional 
procurements[22], requiring the development of different skills set from those previously possessed by the public 
sector. Forecasting is another area where public sector client require extensive expertise especially against the 
backdrop that the private partner will be paid based on patronage.  Many times, the private sector consortium 
provide very optimistic demand profile for most projects in order to secure the contract with the intent of resorting 
to renegotiations once the contract has been awarded. The result has been the report of demand and benefit 
forecasts that are wrong by 20–70% compared with actual development[23], but [24] puts this figure within the 
range of 20-30%  and these wrong forecasts eventually lead to the concessionaire’s inability to meet estimated 
targets in terms of demand and consequently financial performance. For example on the French LGV, forecasts 
were 50% above actual ridership. The effect of this has been that the client either comes to the aid of the provider 
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(London Underground &Metronet) or the project is taken back by the client with its inherent risks (Railtrack). 
When the National Armoury Museum PFI project in the UK could not record the forecasted number of annual 
visitors leading to low fiscal performance, the crisis was resolved by providing additional public funds and 
transferring the operational risk back to the public sector [25]. This concept of pump-priming demand forecast to 
win contracts with the intent of renegotiations later is termed the ‘winner’s curse effect and has received a lot of 
attention from researchers recently especially [26]and[27].  The inexperience of the participants, the over-
commercialization of projects, and high participation cost and time, make PFI procurement less attractive [28]. 
Although the public sector project management in PFI is skilled in client understanding, process understanding and 
political skills, they are however weak in negotiation, whole life cycle costing (including FM), construction, 
financial modeling, stakeholder management, people, and management skills [29]. In a recent survey of public 
sector staff in the UK, it was found that about 80 per cent of respondents admitted that there are significant skills 
gaps in their organizations, and of these 84 per cent said difficulties in recruiting skilled staff were a significant 
contributing factor. They also argued that the planned reductions in departmental headcount will also substantially 
increase the risk of a loss of key skills[30].  
In a related study by the National Audit Office (NAO) assessing the skill requirements for public sector in 
delivering large government infrastructure projects, they observed that the biggest skills gaps for Government are 
in contract management, commissioning and managing advisers, risk identification and management, and 
commercial skills[31]. This lack of adequate PFI skills in the public sector is not limited to pre contract stage 
alone, even during the operational period of the concessions, there is a need to have adequately skilled regulators 
whose duty include overseeing service provision throughout the life of the contract, tariff issues, ensuring quality 
of service and protecting the consumers [32]. Long term contractual form of partnership has 3 characteristics that 
deserve research; the use of private finance, the complexity associated with the long-term contracts and the 
governance of such long-term contracts. The outcome of the first two has major implications for the third-
governance [33]. In spite of private provision of infrastructure, government responsibility continues–citizens will 
continue to hold government accountable for quality of utility services. Government will also need to retain 
sufficient expertise, whether the implementing agency and/ or via a regulatory body, to be able to understand the 
PPP arrangements, to carry out its own obligations under the PPP agreement and to monitor performance of the 
private sector and enforce its obligations [34]. Regulatory governance skills are important because their 
inadequacy have been reported to be responsible for the failure of the Buenos Aires [16] and Cochabamba [14]  
water concessions in Argentina and Bolivia respectively. The importance of financial engineering as a critical PFI 
skill also came to light in the post-Enron scandal where firms aware of resource and capacity constraints on 
regulatory agencies, firms used several accounting charges including special items, discontinued operations, asset 
write-offs and goodwill impairment charges to decrease reported income. Before political sensitivity, the majority 
of special items in the industry were income increasing [35].  
Stakeholder management skills have come to be recognized as very important By both public and private sector 
partners. Stakeholders are individuals or organizations that are either affected by or affect the development of a 
project [36]. They also went further citing [37] to point out that major PFI transport initiatives in the United States 
have reportedly failed due to stakeholder opposition. These failures were mainly because the public was 1) 
unaware of the concept of PPP b) not sufficiently educated about PPP and c) denied access to detailed information 
contained in the consortium’s proposal. The inability of the client to match up with the private provider’s skills 
often leads to renegotiations, disputes, take-overs, buy-backs, abandonment and in extreme cases cancellation of 
the project. The situation for major stakeholders is even more acute due to the ‘privity of contract doctrine’ which 
dictates that only persons who are parties to a contract are entitled to take action to enforce it. A person who stands 
to gain a benefit from the contract (Toll road user, Passenger on a train) is not entitled to take any enforcement 
action if he or she is denied the promised benefit [38]. As can be seen, in figure 1 below, of all the 10 stakeholder 
groups represented, there exists a wide variety of concerns and demands but only the government (client) can have 
a direct legally recognized voice over the activities of the private provider. While for example the workers 
involved with the project would want to quickly finish and move on to another project, the special interest groups 
could be concerned mainly with the protection of the environment and how wastes from nuclear plants are 
disposed. The users of the project would be concerned about affordability while the governments’ concerns would 
encompass efficiency and National security concerns. Therefore, these diverse requirements from all the various 
stakeholder groups creates a huge challenges for contract management because it means that the contract 
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management team would have to possess staff with a wide range of professional skills and knowledge across many 



















The consequences of project failure or cancellation of public infrastructure projects has far reaching 
consequences, not only for the government, but also the public, the local economy and even workers employed by 
the private provider. The employees of Enron lost their life savings and pensions due to the failure of Enron. In 
order to achieve success in PFI procurement, Staff  with experience in complex procurement having a strong mix 
of PFI/PPP, commercial, financial, technical and sector specific experience’ are required and the departments/units 
should be able to attract and retain appropriate expertise [40]. The problem of inadequate PFI experience is 
exacerbated by lack of opportunities to acquire PFI skills[29], because external consultants are often called upon to 
carry out most of the technical advisory works. This use of consultants further adds to the transaction costs of PFI 
projects. Recognizing the need for appropriate skills within the public sector, in 2009-2010 the UK government 
spent 275million on learning and development[30]. This is because a well-institutionalized bureaucracy makes a 
vital contribution to the quality and coherence of decision-making through policy advice and the structuring of the 
decision making process, even though the decisions themselves are taken outside the bureaucracy. Policy capacity 
is indeed a crucial component of public sector capacity [41]. Hence, the project sponsor is ideally placed to identify 
issues of concern and areas for improving management practices within the construction project management[42], 
and without the prerequisite skills they will not be able to discharge their obligations.  
4. Research methodology 
After reviewing existing published journal articles, books, private and public sector sponsored reports, a list of 
17 different skills which are believed to be important to public sector PFI project sponsors were identified. The 
basis for the review process is the belief that knowledge accumulates and one can learn from and build on what 
others have done in the past [43]. The various skills were either identified from literature or through ‘thematic 
analysis’[44] of the duties, responsibilities and objectives of the PPP unit. The identified skills were used to design 
a survey questionnaire which was targeted at PFI practitioners attending two PFI/Infrastructure conferences held in 
Kuala Lumpur Malaysia in March and April 2012. The conferences brought together PFI practitioners from both 
the public and private sectors and across all regions (Africa, Asia, Middle East, Europe and North America). Out of 
the I65 questionnaires that were successfully distributed between the two different conferences, 43 were completed 
and returned representing about 26% response rate which is comparable to [45]’s 21% achieved in the UK. The 
collected data were entered into IBM’s SPSS statistical software version 20 and analysed to draw inferences. 
Fig.1. Project Stakeholder Categories 
Source [39] 
Non-Human, Scientific Environment & 
Natural Environment 
Public represented by the Media, 
Special Interest Groups, 
Authorities & Regulatory 
Parent Corporation/Government 







Users of Projects 
Capital 
Subcontractors, Consultants, 
Contributors to the Project 
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5. Results and discussions 
The data were subjected to various tests including reliability test, validity test, independent sample t-test, 
normality test and inferences were drawn from the output values. Finally the Relative Importance Index (RII) was 
used to rank the factors to reveal the most important skills as perceived by the respondents; and the RII was used 
by [46] to rank Important Skills of Effective Project Leaders. The data reveals that 27 of the respondents worked 
for the public sector while 16 worked in the private sector. Across regions, 7 of the respondents came from Africa, 
28 from Australasia (a grouping of Asia and Australia), 5 from Middle East, 1 delegate from Europe and 2 
delegates from North America while no delegate from Latin America took part. The reliability test carried out on 
the data returned a good internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.961 which shows that the instrument 
was ‘highly’ reliable using the guide provided by [47]. The validity can be calculated by taking the square roots of 
the reliability coefficient [48], hence the validity score for this data with reliability coefficient of α=0.961 will be 
.980. Using the classification guide provided by [49] where a validity test score of more than 0.90 is statistically 
considered excellent. This means that the questionnaire measured what it was constructed to measure. However, 
before deciding which tests to perform on the data, the normality of the data had to be ascertained, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  statistics returned a value of .235 with a p-value of sig=.000 which is statistically 
significant since it is less than .05. A non-significant result (sig value of more than .05) indicates normality [50].  
Given the above results from the normality test, the non-parametric tests will then be used to analyse the data 
and draw inferences. To compare the two independent samples (public & private sector respondents) the Mann-
Whitney U test was employed, this is the non-parametric equivalent of the t-test for independent samples. The test 
results returned a p-value of sig= .230. This indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
rankings of the public and private sector respondents. A comparison of regional perception was performed using 
the Mann Whitney U test to compare Australasia which has the highest number of respondents 28 and the rest of 
the globe (Africa, Middle East, Europe, and North America) which totaled 15. This was done because it would be 
unfair to compare individual regions due to the very low number of respondents from individual regions compared 
with Australasia. The test returned a p-value sig=.458. This indicates that there is also no statistically significant 
difference between Austrasia and all other regions in their rankings. 
Having ascertained there is no statistically significant difference between the scores of the two sectors and 
across regions, the Relative importance index (RII) was then used to rank the variables according to sectors and an 
average was computed to produce the overall ranking of all the respondents. The relative importance index (RII) 
has been used in the past to rank factors or variables by [46], [51] and [52]. The RII generates values from 0 to 1 
and the closer the value is to 1 the more important it is. From the results on table 1 below, both sectors ranked 
‘stakeholder management’ RII= 0.87 as the most important skill and this resulted in this factor being the most 
important overall. The result is consistent with the argument put forward by [36] that a positive involvement with 
stakeholders can be a decisive factor that can ‘make or break’ a PPP project. Inadequate stakeholder management 
on the part of the regulatory agency was a contributing factor to the failure and subsequent protests that led to the 
Cochabamba water crisis. ‘Contract management’ and ‘Bid evaluation skills’ were ranked second overall RII= 
0.85 and also enjoyed the same ranking on the private sector side. However, Contract Management enjoyed the 
same position on the public sector side but bid evaluation ranked in fourth place. The need to have adequate 
contract management skills stems from the very nature of PFI projects which have been described as “inherently 
incomplete contracts” by [53]. Risk management skills was ranked in fourth place overall but the private sector 
ranked it in fifth place while the public sector ranked it in third place.  
Regulatory governance skills was ranked fifth overall but ended up in fourth place on the private sector ranking 
and seventh place on the public sector ranking. Regulation occupies a very critical place in infrastructure 
privatisation; it covers the monitoring of quality of service, dispute resolution between providers and end-users. 
Weak regulatory governance was responsible for the failure of the Buenos Aires water concession project 
[16].However closing at the rear was ‘demand forecasting skills’ RII= 0.66 while ‘output specification’ and ‘sector 
knowledge’ which are two very important skills that the public sector should possess under the PFI regime both 
ranked in the16th place out of the 17 variables in the study.Though it is surprising that these variables rank so 
poorly because, without sector knowledge, adequately designing and agreeing on an appropriate tariff regime 
would be problematic. Demand forecasting skills are also important because most of the failures experienced in 
large scale PFI projects especially in the transport sector were mainly due to inability to garner the forecasted 
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volume of road users leading to what [54] referred to as “benefit shortfall”. Managing external advisers and 
design/Technical skills were ranked in 13th and 14th places respectively. This happens to be a summary view across 
both sectors since the test statistics has shown that there is no statistically significant difference between the scores 
of both sectors. 
 
Table 1: RII of PFI skills 
S/No. Skills   Rank Private  sector Rank 
Public  
Sector 
1 Stakeholder management skills 1 0.84 1 0.89 
2 Contract management skills 2 0.83 2 0.87 
3 Bid Evaluation skills 3 0.83 4 0.86 
4 Risk identification and mgt skills 5 0.80 3 0.87 
5 Regulatory governance skills 4 0.83 7 0.85 
6 Negotiation skills 7 0.79 5 0.86 
7 Business analysis skills 8 0.79 6 0.86 
8 Life-cycle costing skills 6 0.80 11 0.82 
9 Environmental/sustainability skills 9 0.79 12 0.82 
10 Financial engineering skills 10 0.79 13 0.81 
11 Human capital skills 12 0.75 10 0.83 
12 Contract Design skills 11 0.76 14 0.81 
13 Manage external advisers 13 0.75 15 0.81 
14 Design/Technical Skills 14 0.74 17 0.76 
15 Sector knowledge 16 0.54 8 0.85 
16 Output specification skills 15 0.55 9 0.84 
17 Demand forecasting skills   17 0.51 16 0.81 
 
A cursory look at the table reveals a unique pattern regarding the perceptions of both sectors with regards to 
convergence or agreement on individual variable. The way the RII works is that when all respondents favour one 
extreme, the values tend to be very high or very low depending on which extreme is favoured. But when the values 
hover around 0.60-0.70, it means that there is no convergence among group members on the affected variable. 
What this means is that there is a sizable number of respondents favouring both extremes of the scale used. 
Therefore, looking at the above ranking, it can be seen that there is more convergence among the public sector 
respondents than on the private sector. The explanation could be that since business wise, there is a tendency for a 
private sector respondent to be involved on more than one project across different regions and hence has been 
exposed to different demand and outcomes across many projects. But on the part of those in the public sector, they 
are mostly acquainted with PFI projects within their countries only, and could not have participated on many 
projects to be able to appreciate to what extent individual skills hold up as being important in the overall scheme of 
things. 
6. Conclusions 
The lack of adequate skills to deliver infrastructure projects was one of the major reasons that gave birth to PFI 
in the first place. Rather than improve the skills of the public sector in delivering public infrastructure and services, 
the responsibility for infrastructure was turned over to the private sector. Those public sector staff that had the 
required skills left the public service where remunerations were poor in search of better paying jobs in the private 
sector or were employed by the concession company taking over former government corporations. The continuous 
disputes and consequent failures that have bedeviled infrastructure privatisation have forced the need to have a re-
assessment of the situation. The recent fact finding report from the UK [13] was revealing in its findings. 
According to the report, a substantial number of private sector respondents who responded to the call for evidence 
all pointed out that the lack of PFI skills on the part of the public sector clients was a major obstacle to achieving 
the objectives of the PFI across most of the projects in the UK. In response to these findings the government has 
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now reformed the PFI into what it now refers to as the PF2, with one of the most important focus being the need to 
identify the skills required by the public sector client and the best method of developing these skills within the 
client organisation[13].   
The results of this study are a step towards identifying the critical skills that PFI client organisations need. 
While these skills may vary depending on the type of government, region and cultural practices, the results from 
this study are fairly representative of the general needs across regions. There could be a tendency that the result 
and ranking may turn out differently if assessed according to professions or responsibilities since a typical PFI 
team would require the services of engineers, lawyers, accountants & auditors, planners and economists to mention 
a few. The importance of good stakeholder management cannot be over-emphasised. The result of the study has 
also reinforced that position, the importance of ‘stakeholder management skills’ to build a solid support base for a 
project, if success is the goal. Therefore, it is pertinent for the public sector client to analyse its human resource 
capital to ensure it has the right type of expertise to ensure a better outcome on PFI projects. In order to manage 
shortages of certain types of skills, a framework should be put in place to attract and retain such skills from the 
private sector. 
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